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Abstract In games with a permission structure it is assumed that players in a coop-
erative transferable utility game are hierarchically ordered in the sense that there are
players that need permission from other players before they are allowed to cooperate.
We provide axiomatic characterizations of Banzhaf permission values being solutions
that are obtained by applying the Banzhaf value to modified TU-games. In these char-
acterizations we use power- and player split neutrality properties. These properties
state that splitting a player’s authority and/or contribution over two players does not
change the sum of their payoffs.
Keywords Cooperative game theory · Permission structure · Banzhaf value ·
Split neutrality
JEL classification C71 · Z13
1 Introduction
A situation in which a finite set of players N ⊂ IN can generate certain payoffs by
cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility (or sim-
ply a TU-game), being a pair (N , v) where v : 2N → IR is a characteristic function on
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the author.
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N satisfying v(∅) = 0. For any coalition E ⊆ N , v(E) ∈ IR is the worth of coalition
E , i.e. the members of coalition E can obtain a total payoff of v(E) by agreeing to
cooperate. We denote the collection of all characteristic functions on player set N
by GN .
In a TU-game (N , v) there are no restrictions on the cooperation possibilities of the
players, i.e. every coalition E ⊆ N is feasible and can generate a worth. Various mod-
els with restrictions on coalition formation are discussed in the literature. In this paper
we consider games with a permission structure which describe situations in which
the players in a TU-game are part of a hierarchical organization, referred to as a per-
mission structure, such that there are players that need permission from other players
before they are allowed to cooperate.1 Thus, the possibilities of coalition formation
are determined by the positions of the players in the permission structure. Various
assumptions can be made about how a permission structure affects the cooperation
possibilities. In the disjunctive approach as considered in Gilles and Owen (1999) and
van den Brink (1997) it is assumed that every player needs permission from at least
one of its predecessors before it is allowed to cooperate with other players. Alterna-
tively, in the conjunctive approach as developed in Gilles et al. (1992) and van den
Brink and Gilles (1996), it is assumed that every player needs permission from all its
predecessors before it is allowed to cooperate.
To take account of the limited cooperation possibilities, for every game with a
permission structure a modified game is defined which assigns to every coalition the
worth of its largest feasible subcoalition in the original game. The disjunctive and
conjunctive approach yield different modified games. A solution for games with a
permission structure is a function that assigns to every such a game a payoff distri-
bution over the individual players. Applying solutions for TU-games to the modi-
fied games yields solutions for games with a permission structure. In the literature
axiomatizations can be found of the disjunctive and conjunctive Shapley permission
values, which are obtained by applying the Shapley value (1953) to the disjunctive,
respectively conjunctive, modified game. The underlying paper considers the disjunc-
tive and conjunctive Banzhaf permission values, which are obtained by applying the
Banzhaf value (which is based on the Banzhaf index for voting games (1965) and is
generalized to TU-games by, e.g., Owen (1975) and Dubey and Shapley (1979)) to
the two modified games.
In van den Brink (1997, 1999) it is shown that the difference between the two Shap-
ley permission values boils down to applying a different fairness or equal gain/loss
property. Disjunctive fairness implies that deleting the arc between a predecessor and
one of its successors (who has at least one other predecessor) changes the payoffs of
these two players by the same amount. Alternatively, conjunctive fairness implies that
deleting the arc between a predecessor and a successor changes the payoffs of that
successor and any of its other predecessors by the same amount. It is easy to verify
that the disjunctive, respectively conjunctive, Banzhaf permission values also satisfy
disjunctive, respectively conjunctive, fairness.
1 Examples of other models where there are restrictions on the possibilities of cooperation are the games in
coalition structure, see, e.g., Aumann and Drèze (1974) and games with limited communication structure,
see, e.g. Myerson (1977).
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These two fairness properties compare the effects of deleting the arc between two
players on the payoffs of these two players, respectively, on the payoffs of the successor
and its other predecessors. They do not compare the change in payoffs of the predeces-
sor of the deleted arc and other predecessors of the successor. Although the effect of
deleting an arc on the payoffs of players depends on the game, it seems reasonable that
for any game the change in payoffs of the predecessor and any other predecessor of
the successor on the deleted arc are in opposite direction. It turns out that the Shapley
permission values do not satisfy this ‘opposite change’ property. However, it turns
out that the Banzhaf permission values do satisfy this property. They even satisfy the
stronger property that the sum of the payoffs of the two predecessors does not change.
Since creating an arc between a player and a predecessor can be seen as a split of
power over the successor between its predecessors, we refer to this property as power
split neutrality.
The main result of this paper is to give an axiomatic characterization of the two
Banzhaf permission values using this power split neutrality property. In order to do that
we need to add two more new axioms that both represent a split of player’s positions in
the permission structure and/or contributions in the game. Here we can extend split or
merge neutrality properties that are similar to those used to characterize the Banzhaf
value for TU-games in, e.g. Lehrer (1988) and Haller (1994). It turns out that these
properties can be adapted in an intuitive way to games with a permission structure
where we consider splitting player’s positions in the permission structure and their
contributions in the game. We introduce two player split neutrality properties stating
that, if a player in a game with permission structure ‘splits’ in two player’s then the
sum of payoffs of the two players into which the existing player is split is equal to the
payoff of the already existing player in the original game with permission structure.
This split concerns both the contributions of the players in the game as well as their
positions in the permission structure. With respect to these positions we distinguish
between a vertical and a horizontal split of a player.
We provide axiomatizations of the Banzhaf permission values using power- and
both player split neutrality properties. Similar as with the Shapley permission values,
the difference between the disjunctive- and conjunctive Banzhaf permission values is
with respect to the fairness axiom.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we state some preliminaries on games
with a permission structure. In Sect. 3 we introduce the player- and power split neutral-
ity properties. In Sect. 4 we then provide axiomatic characterizations of the Banzhaf
permission values, and show logical independence of the axioms. In Sect. 5 we make
some concluding remarks, including adaptations of the split neutrality properties to
obtain new axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley permission values.
2 Preliminaries: games with a permission structure
A permission structure on a finite set of players N ⊂ IN is a mapping S : N → 2N . The
players in S(i) are called the successors of player i ∈ N .2 The players in S−1(i) :=
2 Note that the set {(i, j) ∈ N × N | i ∈ N , j ∈ S(i)} describes a directed graph on N .
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{ j ∈ N | i ∈ S( j)} are called the predecessors of i . A pair (i, j) ∈ N × N with
j ∈ S(i) is called an arc in S. By ̂S we denote the transitive closure of the permission
structure S, i.e., j ∈ ̂S(i) if and only if there exists a sequence of players (h1, . . . , ht )
such that h1 = i, hk+1 ∈ S(hk) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ t − 1, and ht = j . The players in
̂S(i) are called the subordinates of i , and the players in ̂S−1(i) := { j ∈ N | i ∈ ̂S( j)}
are called the superiors of i . In this paper we restrict our attention to hierarchical
permission structures being permission structures S : N → 2N that are
(i) acyclic, i.e., i ∈ ̂S(i) for all i ∈ N , and
(ii) quasi-strongly connected, i.e., there exists an i ∈ N such that ̂S(i) = N\{i}.
In a hierarchical permission structure there exists a unique player i0 such that
̂S(i0) = N\{i0}. Moreover, S−1(i0) = ∅ for this player. We call this player the top-
player in the permission structure. Examples of hierarchical permission structures are
permission trees in which every player, except the top-player, has exactly one prede-
cessor. Since we only consider hierarchical permission structures we will often refer
to these simply as permission structures. We denote the collection of all (hierarchi-
cal) permission structures on a particular player set N by SN . A triple (N , v, S) with
N ⊂ IN, v ∈ GN and S ∈ SN is called a game with a (hierarchical) permission
structure.
In the disjunctive approach to games with a permission structure as developed in
Gilles and Owen (1999) and van den Brink (1997), it is assumed that each player needs
permission from at least one of its predecessors before it is allowed to cooperate with
other players. Consequently, a coalition is feasible if and only if every player in the
coalition, except the top-player i0, has at least one predecessor who also belongs to






∣S−1(i) ∩ E = ∅ for all i ∈ E\{i0}
}
.
Note that this implies that the top-player i0 belongs to every nonempty coalition in
dN ,S . The coalitions in 
d
N ,S are called the disjunctive autonomous coalitions in
S. The largest disjunctive autonomous subset of E ⊆ N in S ∈ SN is denoted by
σ dN ,S(E) = ∪{F ∈ dN ,S | F ⊆ E}, and is called the disjunctive sovereign part of E
in S.3 It consists of those players in E that can be reached by a directed ‘permission
path’ starting from the top-player such that all players on this path belong to coalition
E . Given a game with a permission structure (N , v, S), the disjunctive restriction of
v on S is the modified characteristic function rdN ,v,S : 2N → IR which assigns to every
coalition the worth of its largest disjunctive autonomous subcoalition and thus is given
by rdN ,v,S(E) = v(σ dN ,S(E)) for all E ⊆ N .
Alternatively, in the conjunctive approach as developed in Gilles et al. (1992), van
den Brink and Gilles (1996) and van den Brink (1999), it is assumed that each player
needs permission from all its predecessors before it is allowed to cooperate. This
means that a coalition E is feasible if and only if for every player in the coalition it
3 By the set of disjunctive autonomous coalitions being closed under union, these largest feasible subsets
exist and are unique. Note the difference with the modified games of Myerson (1977) for games with limited
communication structure, which assign to every coalition the sum of the worths of its components.
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Fig. 1 Permission structure S
of Example 2.1
holds that all its predecessors belong to the coalition. The set of feasible coalitions in






∣S−1(i) ⊆ E for all i ∈ E
}
.
The coalitions in the set cN ,S are called the conjunctive autonomous coalitions in S.
The largest conjunctive autonomous subset of E is denoted by σ cN ,S(E) = ∪{F ∈
cN ,S | F ⊆ E}, and is referred to as the conjunctive sovereign part of E in S. It
consists of all players in E whose predecessors all belong to E . Given game with per-
mission structure (N , v, S), the conjunctive restriction of v on S is the characteristic
function rcN ,v,S : 2N → IR given by rcN ,v,S(E) = v(σ cN ,S(E)) for all E ⊆ N .
Example 2.1 Consider the game with permission structure (N , v, S) with N =
{1, 2, 3, 4}, v ∈ GN given by v(E) = 1 if 4 ∈ E, v(E) = 0 if 4 ∈ E , and S ∈ SN given
by S(1) = {2, 3}, S(2) = S(3) = {4}, S(4) = ∅ (Fig. 1).
The disjunctive restriction of v on S is given by rdN ,v,S(E) = 1 if E ∈ {{1, 2, 4},
{1, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}, and rdN ,v,S(E) = 0 otherwise. The conjunctive restriction of v
on S is given by rcN ,v,S(E) = 1 if E = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and rcN ,v,S(E) = 0 otherwise.
A solution for games with a permission structure is a function f that assigns a payoff
distribution f (N , v, S) ∈ IRN to every game with permission structure (N , v, S). The
disjunctive Banzhaf permission value βd is obtained by applying the Banzhaf value
to the disjunctive restricted game, while the conjunctive Banzhaf permission value βc
is obtained by applying the Banzhaf value to the conjunctive restricted game, i.e.,
βd(N , v, S) = Ba(N , rdN ,v,S) and βc(N , v, S) = Ba(N , rcN ,v,S),
where




(v(E) − v(E\{i})) for all i ∈ N .
Alternatively, applying the Shapley value to the disjunctive- and conjunctive restricted
games yields, respectively, the disjunctive Shapley permission value ϕd and the con-
junctive Shapley permission value ϕc, i.e.,
ϕd(N , v, S) = Sh(N , rdN ,v,S) and ϕc(N , v, S) = Sh(N , rcN ,v,S),
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where




(|N | − |E |)!(|E | − 1)!
|N |! (v(E) − v(E\{i})) for all i ∈ N .
Example 2.2 The disjunctive- and conjunctive Banzhaf permission values of the game
with permission structure given in Example 2.1 are βd(N , v, S) = 18 (3, 1, 1, 3) and
βc(N , v, S) = 18 (1, 1, 1, 1). The disjunctive- and conjunctive Shapley permission val-
ues are ϕd(N , v, S) = 112 (5, 1, 1, 5) and ϕ
c(N , v, S) = 14 (1, 1, 1, 1). unionsq
Player i ∈ N is inessential in game with permission structure (N , v, S) if i and
all its subordinates are null players in (N , v), i.e., if v(E) = v(E\{ j}) for all E ⊆ N
and j ∈ {i} ∪ ̂S(i). Player i ∈ N is called necessary in game (N , v) if v(E) = 0 for
all E ⊆ N\{i}. We say that player i ∈ N dominates player j ∈ N completely if all
directed ‘permission paths’ from the top-player i0 to player j contain player i . We









i ∈ {h1, . . . , ht−1} for every sequence of nodes h1, . . . , ht
such that h1=i0, hk+1 ∈ S(hk), k ∈ {1, . . . , t−1}, and ht = j
}
.
We also define S−1(i) = { j ∈ ̂S−1(i) | i ∈ S( j)}. A characteristic function v ∈ GN
is monotone if v(E)  v(F) for all E ⊆ F ⊆ N . The class of all monotone charac-
teristic functions on N is denoted by GNM . Next we recall some axiomatizations of the
Shapley permission values.4
Efficiency For every N ⊂ IN, v ∈ GN and S ∈ SN , it holds that∑i∈N fi (N , v, S) =
v(N ).
Additivity For every N ⊂ IN, v, w ∈ GN and S ∈ SN , it holds that f (N , v +
w, S) = f (N , v, S)+ f (N , w, S), where (v +w) ∈ GN is given by (v +w)(E) =
v(E) + w(E) for all E ⊆ N .
Inessential player property For every N ⊂ IN, v ∈ GN and S ∈ SN , if i ∈ N is
an inessential player in (N , v, S) then fi (N , v, S) = 0.
Necessary player property For every N ⊂ IN, v ∈ GNM and S ∈ SN , if i ∈ N is a
necessary player in (N , v) then fi (N , v, S)  f j (N , v, S) for all j ∈ N .
Weak structural monotonicity For every N ⊂ IN, v ∈ GNM and S ∈ SN , if i ∈ N
and j ∈ S(i) then fi (N , v, S) ≥ f j (N , v, S).
Both Shapley permission values satisfy these five axioms. Further, the disjunctive
Shapley permission value satisfies disjunctive fairness which states that deleting the
arc between two players h and j ∈ S(h) (with |S−1( j)| ≥ 2) changes the payoffs of
players h and j by the same amount. Moreover, also the payoffs of all players i that
4 We refer to van den Brink and Gilles (1996) and van den Brink (1997) for a discussion of these properties.
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completely dominate player h change by this same amount.5 It can be verified from
Examples 2.1 and 2.2 that the conjunctive Shapley permission value does not satisfy
disjunctive fairness. However, it satisfies the alternative conjunctive fairness which
states that deleting the arc between two players h and j ∈ S(h) (with |S−1( j)| ≥ 2)
changes the payoffs of player j and any other predecessor g ∈ S−1( j)\{h} by the
same amount. Moreover, also the payoffs of all players that completely dominate the
other predecessor g change by this same amount. For S ∈ SN , h ∈ N and j ∈ S(h)




S(i)\{ j} if i = h
S(i) if i ∈ N\{h}.
Disjunctive fairness For every N ⊂ IN, v ∈GN and S ∈ SN , if h ∈ N and j ∈
S(h) with |S−1( j)| ≥ 2 then f j (N , v, S) − f j (N , v, S−(h, j)) = fi (N , v, S) −
fi (N , v, S−(h, j)) for all i ∈ {h} ∪ S−1(h).
Conjunctive fairness For every N ⊂ IN, v ∈ GN and S ∈ SN , if h, j, g ∈ N
are such that h = g and j ∈ S(h) ∩ S(g) then f j (N , v, S) − f j (N , v, S−(h, j)) =
fi (N , v, S) − fi (N , v, S−(h, j)) for all i ∈ {g} ∪ S−1(g).
The axioms described above characterize the two Shapley permission values.
Theorem 2.3 (i) (van den Brink 1997) A solution f is equal to the disjunctive
Shapley permission value ϕd if and only if it satisfies efficiency, additivity,
the inessential player property, the necessary player property, weak structural
monotonicity and disjunctive fairness.
(ii) (van den Brink 1999) A solution f is equal to the conjunctive Shapley per-
mission value ϕc if and only if it satisfies efficiency, additivity, the inessential
player property, the necessary player property, weak structural monotonicity
and conjunctive fairness.
3 Power and player split neutrality
The two fairness axioms that are mentioned in the previous section compare the effects
of deleting the arc between players h and j ∈ S(h) on the payoffs of players h and
j , respectively, on the payoffs of players g ∈ S−1( j)\{h} and j . These properties do
not compare the change in payoffs of players h and g ∈ S−1( j)\{h} after deleting
the arc between h and j . The opposite change property states that deleting the arc
between player h and j ∈ S(h) (with |S−1( j)| ≥ 2) changes the payoffs of players
h and g ∈ S−1( j)\{h} in opposite direction. The Shapley permission values do not
5 This property is some kind of equal-loss-or-gain property. Since it is related to fairness as introduced in
Myerson (1977) for games with a limited communication structure, we refer to this property as (disjunc-
tive) fairness. Note that in disjunctive fairness we require that the successor on the arc to be deleted has
at least two predecessors, implying that the permission structure that is left after deleting the arc is still
quasi-strongly connected.
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Fig. 2 An illustration of
permission structures S and
SV (h, j)
satisfy this property.6 It turns out that the disjunctive and conjunctive Banzhaf permis-
sion values do satisfy this opposite change property. They even satisfy the stronger
property which requires that the sum of the payoffs of the two predecessors does not
change. Since creating an arc between a player and a predecessor can be seen as a split
of the power over this player (i.e. a transfer of the authority of h over j to player g),
we refer to this property as power split neutrality.
Power split neutrality For every N ⊂ IN, v ∈ GN and S ∈ SN , if h, g, j ∈ N
are such that h = g and j ∈ S(h) ∩ S(g) then fh(N , v, S) + fg(N , v, S) =
fh(N , v, S−(h, j)) + fg(N , v, S−(h, j)).
In the context of (unrestricted) TU-games, Haller (1994) uses collusion neutrality
properties in characterizing the Banzhaf value. Collusion neutrality properties are some
kind of stability properties in the sense that no two players can do better by merg-
ing into one player, and no single player does better by splitting in two.7 Whereas
Haller (1994)’s collusion properties concern the collusion of players contributions
in the game, power split neutrality as defined above can be seen as a collusion of
players with respect to their authority in the permission structure, keeping the game
unchanged. In terms of games with a permission structure, Haller (1994)’s collusion
neutrality properties with respect to player contributions can be nicely interpreted in
terms of the game and the permission structure, where both a player’s contribution
in the game as well as its position in the permission structure is split. We consider
two such properties: one in which a player splits in two players in a vertical line, and
another in which a player splits at the bottom level.8
First, let h ∈ IN\N be a new player whose only task is to supervise player j . So, h
will be added as a null player to the game, and in the permission structure he becomes
the only predecessor of j and gets all previous predecessors of j as its predecessors,
see Fig. 2. Since its only task is to supervise player j , the new player h does not really
6 Consider, for example, the game with permission structure (N , v, S) given by N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5},
v = u{4,5} − 710 u{4}, where uT denotes the unanimity game of T ⊆ N , T = ∅ [see (5) with cT
= 1], S(1) = {2, 3, 5}, S(2) = S(3) = {4} and S(4) = S(5) = ∅. In this example, ϕd2 (N , v, S) −
ϕd2 (N , v, S−(2,4)) = − 1120 and ϕd3 (N , v, S) − ϕd3 (N , v, S−(2,4)) = − 140 . For the conjunctive Shapley
permission values ϕc2(N , v, S) − ϕc2(N , v, S−(2,4)) = 140 and ϕc3(N , v, S) − ϕc3(N , v, S−(2,4)) = 1120 .
7 We refer to Haller (1994) for further motivation of such neutrality properties.
8 The vertical and horizontal split neutrality axioms used here are based on a slightly different neutrality
property for TU-games as that of Haller (1994) and is defined in the appendix of this paper. Other neutrality
axioms for TU-games are introduced in Lehrer (1988).
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Fig. 3 An illustration of
permission structures S and
SH(h, j)
add anything to the generation of value that was not yet generated by player j , and
therefore we argue that after such a vertical split the sum of the payoffs of players h
and j in the new game with permission structure should be the same as the payoff of
player j in the original game with permission structure.
Vertical split neutrality For every N ⊂ IN, v ∈ GN and S ∈ SN , if h ∈ IN\N
and j ∈ N then f j (N ∪ {h}, vV (h, j), SV (h, j)) + fh(N ∪ {h}, vV (h, j), SV (h, j)) =
f j (N , v, S),where vV (h, j) ∈ GN∪{h} is given by
vV (h, j)(E) = v(E ∩ N ) for all E ⊆ N ∪ {h}, (1)
and SV (h, j) ∈ SN∪{h} is given by




{ j} if i = h
(S(i)\{ j}) ∪ {h} if i ∈ S−1( j)
S(i) if i ∈ N\S−1( j).
(2)
For the second player split neutrality property, suppose that ‘bottom’ player j ∈ N
(having no successors), is split in two players at the same level in the sense that a new
player h enters who gets the same predecessors as j , has no successors (see Fig. 3),
while in the new game h and j veto each other. Again, the presence of h does not
essentially change the generation of value, except that h is needed to get the productive
participation of j . Similar as above, we argue that the sum of the payoffs of players
h and j in the new game with permission structure should be equal to the payoff of
player j in the original game with permission structure.
Horizontal split neutrality For every N ⊂ IN, v ∈ GN and S ∈ SN , if
h ∈ IN \ N and j ∈ N is such that S( j) = ∅ and S−1( j) = ∅ then
f j (N ∪{h}, vH(h, j), SH(h, j))+ fh(N ∪{h}, vH(h, j), SH(h, j)) = f j (N , v, S), where
vH(h, j) ∈ GN∪{h} is given by
vH(h, j)(E) =
{
v(E\{ j}) if E ⊆ N
v(E ∩ N ) if E ⊆ N ∪ {h} with h ∈ E, (3)





∅ if i = h
S(i) ∪ {h} if i ∈ S−1( j)
S(i) if i ∈ N\S−1( j).
(4)
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Proposition 3.1 The disjunctive- and conjunctive Banzhaf permission values satisfy
power split neutrality, vertical split neutrality and horizontal split neutrality.
Proof The proof that βd satisfies power split neutrality is straightforward as soon
as one realizes that σ dN ,S(E)= σ dN ,S−(h, j) (E) whenever h ∈ E or g ∈ E . The proof
that βc satisfies power split neutrality is straightforward as soon as one realizes that
σ cN ,S(E) = σ cN ,S−(h, j) (E) if h ∈ E or g ∈ E .
Vertical split neutrality of βd follows from Proposition A.1 in the appendix and
the fact that rdN ,vV (h, j),SV (h, j) = (rdN ,v,S)h j where vh j is as given in (16).9 Horizontal
split neutrality of βd follows from Proposition A.1 and the fact that rdN ,vH(h, j),SH(h, j) =
(rdN ,v,S)h j . Similar for βc. unionsq
4 Axiomatizations of Banzhaf permission values
From the axioms that characterize the Shapley permission values in Theorem 2.3, the
Banzhaf permission values do not satisfy efficiency. However, they satisfy the weaker
axiom which requires efficiency only for one-player games.
One-player efficiency For every i ∈ IN, v ∈ G{i} and S ∈ S{i}, it holds that
fi ({i}, v, S) = v({i}).
Together with the power and player split neutrality axioms of the previous section
and the other properties that characterized the Shapley permission values in Theorem
2.3, this yields axiomatizations of the Banzhaf permission values. Similar as with the
Shapley permission values the two Banzhaf permission values differ with respect to
the fairness axiom.
Theorem 4.1 (i) A solution f is equal to the disjunctive Banzhaf permission value
βd if and only if it satisfies power split neutrality, vertical split neutrality, hor-
izontal split neutrality, one-player efficiency, additivity, the inessential player
property, the necessary player property, weak structural monotonicity and dis-
junctive fairness.
(ii) A solution f is equal to the conjunctive Banzhaf permission value βc if and
only if it satisfies power split neutrality, vertical split neutrality, horizontal
split neutrality, one-player efficiency, additivity, the inessential player property,
the necessary player property, weak structural monotonicity and conjunctive
fairness.
Necessity of the first three axioms follows from Proposition 3.1. Proving that the
Banzhaf permission values satisfy additivity, the inessential player property, the nec-
essary player property, weak structural monotonicity and disjunctive, respectively
conjunctive, fairness is along the same lines as this is shown for the Shapley permis-
sion values in van den Brink (1997) for ϕd and in van den Brink and Gilles (1996) and
9 These statements also follow from Theorem 1 in Algaba et al. (2004) after showing that the modified
antimatroids in that paper are equal to the set of disjunctive feasible coalitions in the manipulated permission
structure.
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Fig. 4 An illustration of
permission structure S−h
van den Brink (1999) for ϕc. Since one-player efficiency is obvious, we focus on the
uniqueness part of the proof. We prove the uniqueness part of Theorem 4.1.(i) in three
steps. First, we prove a lemma for positively scaled unanimity games with a permission
tree that has no inessential players. We denote by SNtree = {S ∈ SN | for all i ∈ N
it holds that |S−1(i)| ≤ 1} the class of all permission trees on N . For T ⊆ N , T = ∅,
and cT > 0, the positively scaled unanimity game wT = cT uT is given by
wT (E) =
{
cT if T ⊆ E
0 otherwise. (5)
For S ∈ SN and h ∈ N , the permission structure S−h on N\{h} describes a permis-
sion structure without player h where all successors of h become successor of the
predecessors of h, and thus is given by (Fig. 4)
S−h(i) =
{
(S(i)\{h}) ∪ S(h) if i ∈ S−1(h)
S(i) if i ∈ N\({h} ∪ S−1(h)). (6)





for T ⊆ N .
Lemma 4.2 If solution f satisfies power split neutrality, vertical split neutrality, hor-
izontal split neutrality, one-player efficiency, the necessary player property and weak
structural monotonicity, then f (N , wT , S) is uniquely determined for all S ∈ SNtree
and wT = cT uT with cT > 0, and T ⊆ N satisfying T ∪ ̂S−1(T ) = N.
Proof Suppose that solution f satisfies the six axioms. Consider a hierarchical permis-
sion (tree) structure S ∈ SNtree and monotone characteristic function wT = cT uT , T ⊆
N , cT > 0 with T ∪ ̂S−1(T ) = N . (So, there are no inessential players.) Clearly, f
satisfying the necessary player property implies that there exists a constant c∗ ∈ IR
such that fi (N , wT , S) = c∗ for all i ∈ T , and fi (N , wT , S) ≤ c∗ for all i ∈ N\T .
But then weak structural monotonicity and the fact that ̂S(i) = S(i) for all i ∈ N and
S ∈ SNtree imply that
fi (N , wT , S) = c∗ for all i ∈ T ∪ S−1(T ) = T ∪ ̂S−1(T ) = N . (7)
So, we have uniquely determined f (N , wT , S) if we determine c∗. We do this by
induction on |N |.
If |N | = 1 then one-player efficiency implies that fi (N , wT , S) = cT for i ∈ N .
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Fig. 5 An illustration of
permission structures S, S′ and
S′′ of the proof of Lemma 4.2
case (iii)
Proceeding by induction assume that fi (N ′, wT ′ , S′) = cT ′2|N ′ |−1 for all (N ′, wT ′ , S′)
with S′ ∈ SN ′tree, cT ′ > 0, T ′ ∪ (̂S′)−1(T ′) = N ′ and |N ′| < |N |.
We distinguish the following three cases (of which at least one must occur).
(i) Suppose there exist h, g, j ∈ N , h = g, such that S(h) = S( j) = ∅ and
{h, j} ⊆ S(g). (Note that this case can only occur if |N | ≥ 3.) By the assumption
that T ∪ ̂S−1(T ) = N , we have {h, j} ⊆ T . Since cT uT = (cT uT \{h})H(h, j)
and S = (S−h)H(h, j) with vH(h, j) and SH(h, j) as given in (3) and (4), horizontal
split neutrality implies that
f j (N , wT , S) + fh(N , wT , S) = f j (N\{h}, cT uT \{h}, S−h). (8)
Since S−h ∈ SN\{h}tree the induction hypothesis implies that f j (N\{h},
cT uT \{h}, S−h) = cT2|N |−2 . With (7) and (8) it then follows that 2c∗ = cT2|N |−2 ,
and thus fi (N , wT , S) = c∗ = cT2|N |−1 for all i ∈ N .(ii) Suppose that there exist j ∈ T and h ∈ N\T with S( j) = ∅ and S(h) = { j}.
Since wT = (wT )V (h, j) and S = (S−h)V (h, j) with vV (h, j) and SV (h, j) as given
in (1) and (2), vertical split neutrality implies that
f j (N , wT , S) + fh(N , wT , S) = f j (N\{h}, wT , S−h).
Similar as in case (i), with the induction hypothesis and (7) this yields that
2c∗ = cT2|N |−2 , and thus fi (N , wT , S) = c∗ = cT2|N |−1 for all i ∈ N .(iii) Suppose that there exist h, j ∈ T with S( j) = ∅ and S(h) = { j}. Then take a





{h, j} if i = g
(S(i)\{h}) ∪ {g} if i ∈ S−1(h)
S(i) if i ∈ N\S−1(h)
(Note that S′′ ∈ SN∪{g}tree since h and g are both predecessor of player j in S′′.)
Since T ∪ S′′−1(T ) = N ∪ {g}, the necessary player property and weak structural
monotonicity imply that there is a c∗∗ ∈ IR such that
fi (N ∪ {g}, wT , S′′) = c∗∗ for all i ∈ N ∪ {g}. (9)
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Since ((N ∪ {g})\{h}, cT uT \{h}, S′′−h) ∈ S(N∪{g})\{h}tree (with |(N ∪ {g}\{h})| = |N |) is
as considered in case (ii), it follows from that case that
fi ((N ∪ {g})\{h}, cT uT \{h}, S′′−h) =
cT
2|N |−1
for all i ∈ (N ∪ {g})\{h}.
But then, by S′′−(h, j) = (S′′−h)H(h, j) and wT = (cT uT \{h})H(h, j), horizontal split
neutrality implies that f j (N ∪ {g}, wT , S′′−(h, j)) + fh(N ∪ {g}, wT , S′′−(h, j)) =
f j ((N ∪{g})\{h}, cT uT \{h}, S′′−h) = cT2|N |−1 . With the necessary player property, weak
structural monotonicity and the fact that T ∪ S′′−(h, j)
−1
(T ) = N ∪ {g} this yields
fi (N ∪ {g}, wT , S′′−(h, j)) =
cT
2|N |
for all i ∈ N ∪ {g}. (10)
Further, power split neutrality implies that
fh(N ∪ {g}, wT , S′′) + fg(N ∪ {g}, wT , S′′) = fh(N ∪ {g}, wT , S′′−(h, j))
+ fg(N ∪ {g}, wT , S′′−(h, j)) (11)
which with (9) and (10) yields
fi (N ∪ {g}, wT , S′′) = cT2|N | for all i ∈ N ∪ {g}. (12)
Since S′ = S′′−(g, j) again applying power split neutrality yields
fh(N ∪ {g}, wT , S′) + fg(N ∪ {g}, wT , S′) = fh(N ∪ {g}, wT , S′′)
+ fg(N ∪ {g}, wT , S′′)
which with the necessary player property, weak structural monotonicity, T ∪
S′−1(T ) = N ∪ {g} and (12) yields
fi (N ∪ {g}, wT , S′) = cT2|N | for all i ∈ N ∪ {g}.
Finally, since S′ = SV (g,h) and wT = (wT )V (g,h), vertical split neutrality yields
fh(N , wT , S) = fh(N ∪ {g}, wT , S′) + fg(N ∪ {g}, wT , S′) = cT2|N |−1 ,
and thus with (7) we have fi (N , wT , S) = c∗ = cT2|N |−1 for all i ∈ N .
So, for S ∈ SNtree and wT = cT uT with cT > 0 and T ∪̂S−1(T ) = N , we conclude
that fi (N , wT , S) = c∗ = cT2|N |−1 for all i ∈ T ∪ ̂S−1(T ) = N . unionsq
The next step is to show that adding the inessential player property and disjunctive
fairness to the axioms implies that f is uniquely determined for all positively scaled
unanimity games with a permission tree structure (allowing inessential players).
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Lemma 4.3 If solution f satisfies power split neutrality, vertical split neutrality, hor-
izontal split neutrality, one-player efficiency, the inessential player property, the nec-
essary player property, weak structural monotonicity and disjunctive fairness, then
f (N , wT , S) is uniquely determined whenever S ∈ SNtree and wT = cT uT for some
T ⊆ N , T = ∅, and cT > 0.
Proof Suppose that solution f satisfies the eight axioms. Consider a permission (tree)
structure S ∈ SNtree and monotone characteristic function wT = cT uT for some
cT > 0, T ⊆ N , T = ∅. Denote αS(T ) = T ∪ ̂S−1(T ). We distinguish the case
where all players, except the top-player, are inessential from the other cases.
A. We first consider the case that T = {i0}.
Since all players in N\αS(T ) are inessential players in (N , wT , S), the inessential
player property implies that fi (N , wT , S) = 0 for all i ∈ N\αS(T ). Further, f sat-
isfying the necessary player property and weak structural monotonicity and the fact
that ̂S(i) = S(i) for all i ∈ N and S ∈ SNtree, imply that there exists a constant c∗ ∈ IR
such that fi (N , wT , S) = c∗ for all i ∈ αS(T ). So,
fi (N , wT , S) =
{
c∗ if i ∈ αS(T ) = T ∪ ̂S−1(T )
0 if i ∈ N\αS(T ). (13)
So, we have determined f (N , wT , S) if we determine c∗. In particular, fi0(N , wT ,
S) = c∗. We determine c∗ by induction on |N\αS(T )|.
If |N\αS(T )| = 0 then c∗ = cT2|N |−1 = cT2|αS (T )|−1 is uniquely determined by Lemma
4.2.
Proceeding by induction assume that c∗ = fi0(N ′, wT ′ , S′) is uniquely determined
for all (N ′, wT ′ , S′) with S′ ∈ SN ′tree, cT ′ > 0 and |N ′\αS′(T ′)| < |N\αS(T )|.
Since N\αS(T ) = ∅ there exists a j ∈ N\αS(T ) with S( j) = ∅. We distinguish
the following two cases (of which at least one must occur).
(i) Suppose that αS(T ) = {i0} and j ∈ ̂S(h) for all h ∈ αS(T )\{i0}. Since T = {i0}
there is an h ∈ αS(T ) ∩ S(i0). Define S′, S′′ ∈ SN by
S′(i) =
{ {h} if i = j
S(i) otherwise
and S′′ = S′−(i0,h). (Note that S′ ∈ SNtree since player h has two predecessors in
S′ (Fig. 6). Also note that S′′ ∈ SNtree.)
Since |N\αS′′(T )| < |N\αS(T )|, the induction hypothesis implies that all
fi (N , wT , S′′), i ∈ N , are known. Since S = S′−( j,h) and S′′ = S′−(i0,h), twice
applying power split neutrality implies that
f j (N , wT , S) + fi0(N , wT , S) = f j (N , wT , S′) + fi0(N , wT , S′)
= f j (N , wT , S′′) + fi0(N , wT , S′′)
which with (13) and the induction hypothesis yields that fi (N , wT , S)= c∗, i ∈
αS(T ), is uniquely determined.
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Fig. 6 An illustration of
permission structures S′ and S′′
of the proof of Lemma 4.3 case
A.(i), with j ∈ S(i0)
Fig. 7 An illustration of
permission structures S′ and S′′
of the proof of Lemma 4.3 case
A.(ii) with h ∈ S(i0) and
j ∈ S(h)
(ii) Suppose that αS(T ) = {i0} and there is an h ∈ αS(T )\{i0} with j ∈ ̂S(h).
Define S′, S′′ ∈ SN by (Fig. 7)
S′(i) =
{
S(i) ∪ { j} if i = i0
S(i) otherwise
and S′′ = S′−(g, j) for g ∈ S−1( j) (possibly g = h if j ∈ S(h)). (Note that
S′ ∈ SNtree since player j has two predecessors in S′. Also note that S′′ ∈ SNtree.)
Since S = S′−(i0, j) and j is an inessential player in (N , wT , S) and (N , wT , S′),
disjunctive fairness and the inessential player property imply that fi0(N , wT , S′) −
fi0(N , wT , S) = f j (N , wT , S′) − f j (N , wT , S)= 0. Thus
fi0(N , wT , S′) = fi0(N , wT , S). (14)
Since S′′ = S′−(g, j) for g ∈ S−1( j), and j is also an inessential player in (N , wT ,
S′′), disjunctive fairness, the inessential player property and g ∈ S′(i0) ∩ S′′(i0) also
imply that fi0(N , wT , S′) − fi0(N , wT , S′′) = f j (N , wT , S′) − f j (N , wT , S′′) = 0.
Thus fi0(N , wT , S′) = fi0(N , wT , S′′). So, with (14) it follows that fi0(N , wT , S) =
fi0(N , wT , S′) = fi0(N , wT , S′′). Since S′′ is as in case (i) we have uniquely deter-
mined fi0(N , wT , S) = fi0(N , wT , S′′) = c∗.
So, in both cases A.(i) and A.(ii) we uniquely determined c∗ and thus, with (13) we
uniquely determined f (N , wT , S).
B. Next we consider the case T = {i0}.
Then αS(T ) = {i0}. The inessential player property implies that fi (N , wT , S) = 0
for all i ∈ N\{i0}.
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Consider game with permission structure (N ∪ {g}, wT , SV (g,i0)). Since wT =
(wT )
V (g,i0)
, vertical split neutrality implies that fi0(N ∪ {g}, wT , SV (g,i0)) +
fg(N ∪ {g}, wT , SV (g,i0)) = fi0(N , wT , S). The necessary player property and
weak structural monotonicity imply that fi0(N ∪ {g}, wT , SV (g,i0))) = fg(N ∪
{g}, wT , SV (g,i0))). Thus fi0(N , wT , S) = 2 fi0(N ∪ {g}, wT , SV (g,i0))). Since (N ∪
{g}, wT , SV (g,i0))) is as considered in Case A, we determined fi0(N , wT , S) = c∗ =
2 fi0(N ∪ {g}, wT , SV (g,i0))). unionsq
Finally, by adding additivity to the axioms of Lemma 4.3 we prove the main result.
Proof of Theorem 4.1.(i) Since βd satisfying the nine axioms follows from Proposi-
tion 3.1 or follows similar as it is shown for Shapley permission values, we only show
that there can be at most one solution that satisfies the nine axioms. Therefore, suppose
that solution f satisfies the nine axioms. Consider the hierarchical permission struc-
ture S ∈ SN and the monotone characteristic function wT = cT uT , cT ≥ 0, as given
in (5). If cT = 0 then the inessential player property implies that fi (N , wT , S) = 0
for all i ∈ N .
Now suppose that cT > 0. Again, we denote by αS(T ) = T ∪ ̂S−1(T ) the set
consisting of all players in T and all their superiors. For S ∈ SN \SNtree there is at
least one i ∈ N with ̂S−1i (T ) = S
−1
i (T ). Therefore, by γS(T ) := {i ∈ αS(T ) |
T ∩ ({i} ∪ S(i)) = ∅} we denote the set of those players in αS(T ) who belong to T
or have subordinates in T that they dominate completely.
Again, the inessential player property implies that fi (N , wT , S) = 0 for all
i ∈ N\αS(T ). Further, f satisfying the necessary player property and weak structural
monotonicity implies that there exists a constant c∗ ∈ IR such that fi (N , wT , S) = c∗
for all i ∈ γS(T ). We prove that c∗ and all fi (N , wT , S), i ∈ αS(T )\γS(T ),
are uniquely determined by induction on the number
∑
i∈N |S(i)|. (Note that
∑
i∈N |S(i)| ≥ |N | − 1 for all S ∈ SN .)
If
∑
i∈N |S(i)| = |N | − 1 then S ∈ SNtree and f (N , wT , S) is uniquely determined
by Lemma 4.3.
Proceeding by induction assume that f (N , wT , S′) is uniquely determined for all
S′ ∈ SN with ∑i∈N |S′(i)| <
∑
i∈N |S(i)|.
Next we recursively define the sets Lk, k ∈ {0} ∪ IN, by



















, for all k ∈ IN.
In van den Brink and Gilles (1994) it is shown that for hierarchical permission struc-
tures there exists an M < ∞ such that the sets L1, . . . , L M form a partition of N
consisting of non-empty sets only.
Next we describe a procedure which determines the values fi (N , wT , S) as c∗ plus
some constant ci , i.e. we determine the values ci , i ∈ N , such that
fi (N , wT , S) = c∗ + ci , for all i ∈ N (15)
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Step 1 For every i ∈ L1 one of the following two conditions is satisfied:
(i) If i ∈ N\αS(T ) then fi (N , wT , S) = 0 as mentioned before. Thus
ci = −c∗.
(ii) If i ∈ αS(T ) then i ∈ T since S(i) = ∅. Thus fi (N , wT , S) = c∗, i.e.
ci = 0.
Set k = 2. Goto Step 2.
Step 2 If Lk = ∅ then Stop.
Else, for every i ∈ Lk one of the following three conditions is satisfied:
(i) If i ∈ N\αS(T ) then fi (N , wT , S) = 0, and thus ci = −c∗.
(ii) If i ∈ γS(T ) then fi (N , wT , S) = c∗, and thus ci = 0.
(iii) If i ∈ αS(T )\γS(T ) then by definition of αS(T ) and γS(T ) there exists
an h ∈ {i} ∪ S(i) and a j ∈ S(h) such that |S−1( j)| ≥ 2. Disjunctive
fairness implies that
fi (N , wT , S) − fi (N , wT , S−(h, j))
= f j (N , wT , S) − f j (N , wT , S−(h, j)),
and thus
ci = c j − f j (N , wT , S−(h, j)) + fi (N , wT , S−(h, j)).
Using the induction hypothesis (implying that f j (N , wT , S−(h, j)) and
fi (N , wT , S−(h, j)) are known), and the fact that j ∈ ̂S(i) (implying
that we already determined c j since j ∈ Ll with l < k), it follows that
we have determined ci .
Step 3 Set k = k + 1. Goto Step 2.
Since there exists an M < ∞ such that the sets L1, . . . , L M form a partition of
N consisting of non-empty sets only, the procedure described above determines the
values ci , i ∈ N , which with (15) yield fi (N , wT , S) = c∗ + ci for all i ∈ N . So, we
only have to determine c∗. We distinguish the following two cases.
(i) Suppose there exists j ∈ αS(T ) with |S−1( j)| ≥ 2. Take h, g ∈ N , h = g,
such that j ∈ S(h) ∩ S(g). Power split neutrality implies that
fh(N , wT , S) + fg(N , wT , S) = fh(N , wT , S−(g, j)) + fg(N , wT , S−(g, j)),
which with the induction hypothesis yields that fh(N , wT , S) + fg(N , wT , S)
is known. With (15) and the fact that all ci are known, c∗ is uniquely determined.
(ii) Suppose that |S−1( j)| = 1 for all j ∈ αS(T )\{i0}. Then, by assumption, there
exists a j ∈ N\αS(T ) with |S−1( j)| ≥ 2. Take h ∈ S−1( j). Disjunctive
fairness, the inessential player property and j ∈ S(i0) imply that
fi0(N , wT , S)− fi0(N , wT , S−(h, j)) = f j (N , wT , S)− f j (N , wT , S−(h, j))=0.
So, c∗ = fi0(N , wT , S) = fi0(N , wT , S−(h, j)) is uniquely determined by the induc-
tion hypothesis.
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In both cases we determined c∗. Since we already determined all ci , i ∈ N ,
with (15) we then uniquely determined all values fi (N , wT , S), i ∈ N , for wT =
cT uT , cT ≥ 0.
Now, let S ∈ SN and consider the characteristic function wT = cT uT with
cT < 0.10 Let v0 ∈ GN denote the null game, i.e., v0(E) = 0 for all E ⊆ N .
From the inessential player property it follows that fi (N , v0, S) = 0 for all
i ∈ N . Since wT + (−wT ) = v0, additivity of f implies that f (N , wT , S) =
f (N , v0, S)− f (N ,−wT , S) = − f (N ,−wT , S). Since−wT = −cT uT with−cT >
0 is monotone, f (N ,−wT , S) is uniquely determined. Thus also f (N , wT , S) =
− f (N ,−wT , S) is uniquely determined if cT < 0.
Finally, since every characteristic function v ∈ GN can be expressed as a linear
combination of unanimity games as v = ∑ T⊆N
T =∅
(N ,v)(T )uT with (N ,v)(T ) =
∑
F⊆T (−1)|T |−|F |v(F) being the Harsanyi dividends (see Harsanyi 1959), it follows
with additivity of f that f (N , v, S) is uniquely determined for every v ∈ GN and
S ∈ SN . unionsq
The proof of Theorem 4.1.(ii) is obtained in a similar way and is therefore omitted.
We end this section by showing logical independence of the nine axioms of Theorem
4.1.(i). In each of the paragraphs below, we indicate which of the axioms of Theorem
4.1.(i) the solution defined in the paragraph violates:
1. The solution f given by fi0(N , v, S) = v({i0}), and fi (N , v, S) = 0 for all
i ∈ N\{i0} does not satisfy vertical split neutrality. (Remember that i0 denotes
the top-player in S.)
2. The solution f given by f (N , v, S) = βd(N ,∑i∈N v({i})u{i}, S) does not satisfy
horizontal split neutrality.
3. For S ∈ SN and T ⊆ N let Z ST = {Z ∈ SN | Z−1(i) = S−1(i) for all
i ∈ N\αS(T ), Z−1(i) ⊆ S−1(i) for all i ∈ αS(T ), and |Z−1(i)| = 1 for all
i ∈ αS(T )\{i0}} where again αS(T ) = T ∪ ̂S−1(T ). The solution f given by




i (N ,(N ,v)(T )uT , Z), where (N ,v)(T ), T ⊆
N , T = ∅, are the Harsanyi dividends, does not satisfy power split neutrality.
4. The solution f given by fi (N , v, S) = 0 for all i ∈ N does not satisfy one-player
efficiency.
5. For game (N , v) define d(N , v) = max{(N ,v)(T ) | T ⊆ N } and D(N , v) =
{T ⊆ N | (N ,v)(T ) = d(N , v)}. The solution f given by f (N , v, S) =
βd(N ,
∑
T∈D(N ,v) (N ,v)(T )uT , S) does not satisfy additivity.
6. The solution f given by fi (N , v, S) = v(N )2|N |−1 for all i ∈ N , does not satisfy the
inessential player property.
7. The solution f given by fi0(N , v, S) = v(N ) and fi (N , v, S) = 0 for all i ∈
N\{i0} does not satisfy the necessary player property.
8. The solution f given by f (N , v, S) = Ba(N , v) does not satisfy weak structural
monotonicity.
9. The conjunctive Banzhaf permission value βc does not satisfy disjunctive fairness.
10 Note that we cannot apply the necessary player property and weak structural monotonicity to this game
with permission structure, since cT uT is not monotone if cT < 0.
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Table 1 Fairness and split
neutrality properties of
permission values
Split neutrality Grand split neutrality
Disjunctive fairness βd ϕd
Conjunctive fairness βc ϕc
Logical independence of the axioms of Theorem 4.1.(ii) can be shown by the above
solutions 1, 4, 6, 7 and 8, using βc instead of βd in solutions 2, 3 and 5, and replacing
βc by βd in solution 9.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we gave axiomatic characterizations of the disjunctive- and conjunctive
Banzhaf permission values. Comparing these axiomatizations with known axiomati-
zations of the Shapley permission values it turns out that efficiency of the Shapley
permission values is replaced by four other axioms: power split neutrality, vertical
split neutrality, horizontal split neutrality and one-player efficiency. Instead of using
efficiency, we can also characterize the Shapley permission values by similar split neu-
trality axioms as used in characterizing the Banzhaf permission values, but requiring
that splitting a player in two does not change the total sum of payoffs that is distributed
among all players (instead of the sum of the payoffs of two players that are involved).
Since the worth that is generated by the ‘grand coalition’ N , respectively N ∪ {h},
does not change after a power- or player split, for any efficient solution the sum of
payoffs over all players should not change. Adapting power split neutrality, vertical
split neutrality and horizontal split neutrality in this way, it can be shown that replacing
these axioms in Theorem 4.1 by the three ‘grand’ versions described above yields new
characterizations of the two Shapley permission values. Comparing these new axiom-
atizations with those stated in Theorem 2.3, there are two advantages of these new
axiomatizations. First, the new characterization uses weaker axioms since efficiency
of a solution implies grand power split neutrality, grand vertical split neutrality, grand
horizontal split neutrality and one-player efficiency, but the reverse does not hold.
Second, the new axioms are comparable with the axioms characterizing the Banzhaf
permission values in Theorem 4.1 in the sense that they only differ in using the ‘grand’
or ‘pairwise’ power and player split neutrality properties. According to these charac-
terizations, the difference between the Banzhaf- and Shapley permission values is
with respect to how the payoffs react to particular changes in the game and permission
structure that reflect a split of power and/or players. The main difference between the
disjunctive- and conjunctive permission values is with respect to the fairness axiom
that is used. These differences are summarized in Table 1.
Although we showed that the Shapley permission values do not satisfy the opposite
change property, they do satisfy this property for monotone games. More specific,
Table 2 summarizes the effects of deleting the arc between players h and j ∈ S(h) on
the payoffs of players j, h and g ∈ S−1( j)\{h} for monotone games with a permission
structure. Note that power split neutrality as well as the two fairness axioms consider
situations in which an arc is deleted from the permission structure. The properties stated
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Table 2 Effect on permission
values of deleting arc (h, j) with
j ∈ S(g), g = h
Effect on payoff Disjunctive Conjunctive




in Table 2 thus can be seen as stability properties in line with Myerson (1977)’s stability
notion for games with a communication (graph) structure. For monotone games with a
permission structure, deleting an arc between two players never increases the Banzhaf-
and Shapley permission values for the predecessor on the arc. This expresses that in
monotone games it never hurts to dominate other players. For the other predecessors of
the successor on the deleted arc, the permission values never decrease after deleting this
arc. This expresses that in such games it never hurts to dominate your successors with as
few other players as possible. For the successor on the arc there is a distinction between
the disjunctive- and conjunctive permission values. After deleting an arc with one of
its predecessors, its disjunctive permission value does not increase (because having
more predecessors increases the cooperation possibilities of a player in the disjunctive
approach), while its conjunctive permission value does not decrease (because having
more predecessors restricts the cooperation possibilities of a player in the conjunctive
approach).
Note that, although the axioms of Lemma 4.3 determine the solution outcomes for
games with a permission tree, we did not characterize βd on the class of games with a
permission tree since in the proof we used twice (in every induction step) permission
structures that are not trees. In order to characterize the Banzhaf permission values on
the class of games with a permission tree we need to avoid the graph manipulations
yielding the structures S′ in the Cases A.(i) and A.(ii), for example, by using an axiom
which states that inessential players can be ‘deleted’ from the game and permission
structure without changing the payoffs of other players.11
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11 This is a generalization of the null player out property for TU-games (see Derks and Haller 1999). A
generalization of this property is used in Algaba et al. (2004) to characterize the Banzhaf value for games on
antimatroids which generalizes the necessity of the axioms in Theorem 4.1. From the proofs of Theorem 2.3
given in van den Brink (1997, 1999) it follows that those axioms (even without the corresponding fairness)
do characterize the Shapley permission values restricted to the class of games with a permission tree.
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Appendix: A split neutrality of the Banzhaf value
In proving that the Banzhaf permission values satisfy vertical- and horizontal split
neutrality we use the following property of the Banzhaf value for TU-games which
is similar as collusion neutrality defined in Haller (1994) to characterize the Banzhaf
value for TU-games. This proposition states that if a player h ∈ IN\N enters the game
v ∈ GN as a veto player for player j ∈ N , then the sum of the Banzhaf values of
players h and j in the new game is equal to the Banzhaf value of player j in the original
game. The straightforward proof is omitted.12
Proposition A.1 (On TU-games) If N ⊂ IN, v ∈ GN , j ∈ N and h ∈ IN\N then
Bah(N ∪ {h}, vh j ) + Ba j (N ∪ {h}, vh j ) = Ba j (N , v),
where vh j ∈ GN∪{h} is given by
vh j (E) =
{
v(E\{ j}) if E ⊆ N
v(E ∩ N ) if E ⊆ N ∪ {h}, h ∈ E . (16)
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